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Abstract
We study a contextual definition for deterministic monitoring based on consistent detections. It is defined
in terms of the observed behaviour of the monitor when instrumented over arbitrary systems. We give an
alternative, coinductive definition based on controllability which does not rely on system quantifications,
and show that it is fully-abstract wrt. the former definition. We then develop a symbolic counterpart to
the controllability definition to facilitate an automated analysis for controllable monitors involving data.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.3.1 Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs;
F.3.2 Semantics of Programming Languages - Process models; D.2.5 Testing and Debugging
Keywords and phrases Runtime Monitoring, Deterministic Behaviour, Controllability, Compositional
Reasoning, Symbolic Analysis
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2017.4
1 Introduction
Monitors are computational entities that observe the executions of other entities (referred to hereafter
as systems) with the aim of accruing system information [32, 26], comparing system executions
against some behavioural specification [23, 7], or reacting to the observed executions via adaptation or
enforcement procedures [13, 36]. They are typically considered to be part of the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) and, consequently, their descriptions are expected to be correct. A correctness requirement
often presumed of monitors is that they should exhibit deterministic behaviour. Yet, for most
monitoring frameworks, such a requirement is seldom specified in unambiguous terms. In fact, there
are a number of viable alternatives that one could consider (e.g., [44, 29, 25, 1]) and it is unclear how
to choose one over the other in an objective manner. Moreover, these definitions often fail to account
for the instrumentation mechanism used to compose a monitor with the system under scrutiny which
may, in turn, affect monitoring behaviour. All of this leads to a poor understanding of what should be
expected of a monitor, and may give rise to discrepancies between these expectations and what needs
to be guaranteed by the monitor implementer in practice.
Non-determinism is intrinsic to a number of computational models used for expressing monitors
and monitored systems. In fact, a substantial body of work on monitors is either cast in terms of
inherently non-deterministic formalisms such as Büchi automata [45, 17], or formalisms that admit
non-determinism such as process calculi and labelled transition systems [12, 46, 30, 22, 10, 23].
Non-deterministic computation arises naturally in concurrent and distributed programming, used
increasingly for runtime monitoring [37, 24, 21, 8, 11]. Furthermore, a growing number of monitoring
tools employ automata-based specification languages [16, 5, 41, 18] that offer rudimentary support
for ensuring deterministic behaviour: their respective implementations are either thread-unsafe [41]
or admit arbitrary code for transition-triggered actions [14, 16].
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This paper sets out to investigate deterministic behaviour for monitors. The study is limited to
execution monitors (sequence recognisers) [43, 36], used extensively for Runtime Verification (RV).
Our work is developed in terms of an expository formalism (similar to the aforementioned work on
transition-based descriptions) expressing monitored systems that can analyse trace events carrying
data and admit degrees of non-determinism. We propose a contextual definition for deterministic
monitor behaviour, founded on the observational behaviour that can be discerned when a monitor is
instrumented to execute with any arbitrary system under scrutiny. The definition serves two purposes.
First, its contextual nature allows us to admit as many correct monitors as possible, as long as
these cannot be externally perceived to behave non-deterministically—we contend that the resulting
definition is fairly intuitive. Second, it allows us to justify design decisions for an alternative definition
describing the deterministic behaviour of monitors, based instead on the notion of controllability
[31]. We show a correspondence between these two definitions. In addition, we demonstrate how
the alternative definition (which is arguably less intuitive than its contextual counterpart) is more
amenable to automated analyses for assessing the deterministic behaviour exhibited by monitors. In
particular, we study how this alternative definition can be reformulated in symbolic terms, to facilitate
a tractable handling of infinite-state monitor analysis due to data.
I Example 1. The monitor description m1 accepts traces from an authenticator, that challenges
(event chl) a supplicant for an arbitrary value x followed by the supplicant’s authentication (aut) with
the (correct) encoding of x, y = enc(x). The authenticator subsequently acknowledges (ack) using
the same value y. The guard construct chl(x) quantifies over any value x; guards aut〈v〉 and ack〈v〉
require authentications (resp. acknowledgments) for a specific value v. > denotes acceptance.
m1 , chl(x). let y = enc(x) in
(
aut〈y〉.ack〈y〉.>)
m2 , chl(x).let y = enc(x) in
(
aut〈y〉.ack〈y〉.> + aut(z).if z,y then ack(z′).⊥ )
m3 , chl(x).let y = enc(x) in
(
aut〈y〉.ack〈y〉.> + aut(z).if z,y then ack(z′).⊥ else ack〈z〉.>)
It is easy to inadvertently introduce non-determinism. Monitor m2 extends m1 (using the choice
operator, +) with the intention of rejecting (note the verdict ⊥) acknowledgments following authentic-
ations whose value is not the encoding of the challenge value x. When v2,enc(v1), the violating trace
t=chl〈v1〉.aut〈v2〉.ack〈v2〉 . . . is always rejected by m2. More subtly, however, when v2=enc(v1) the
trace t may cause the monitor to non-deterministically choose either branch, whereby the unintended
branch does not reach a > verdict. But non-determinism is not necessarily conducive to inconsistent
verdicts and, in cases where verdicts are considered as the only monitor observable behaviour, such
non-determinism may be tolerated. Monitor m3 deterministically accepts trace t when v2=enc(v1),
albeit along different execution paths, and deterministically rejects it whenever v2,enc(v1). J
The main contributions of the paper are:
1. A contextual definition for observationally deterministic monitoring behaviour, Def. 6.
2. An alternative definition based on controllability, Def. 11, that coincides with it, Thm. 13.
3. Symbolic variants of the latter definition enabling tractable automations, Thms. 21 and 25.
The paper is structured as follows. Sec. 2 presents the monitor framework used for this study,
allowing us motivate our touchstone definition for deterministic monitor behaviour in Sec. 3. Sec. 4
presents a fully-abstract alternative definition that is amenable to compositional reasoning. In Secs. 5
and 6 symbolic variants are developed for automation purposes. Sec. 7 concludes.
2 Systems, Monitors, Instrumentation and Monitored Systems
We perceive systems as entities that generate events while executing. Observable events, η ∈ Evt, are
those visible to a monitor and have the form l〈v〉 where l is an event label taken from a set l, k ∈ Lab,
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Monitors
w, o ∈ Verd ::= > (accept) | ⊥ (reject)
| 0 (inconclusive)
m, n ∈ Mon ::= w (verdict) | let x = e in m (evaluate)
| l〈e〉.m (expression guard) | l(x).m (quantified guard)
| m + n (choice) | if b thenm else n (conditional)
| rec X.m (recursion) | X (monitor variable)
Ver
w
η−→ w
IfT
~b = true
if b thenm else n
τ−→ m
IfF
~b = false
if b thenm else n
τ−→ n
Let
~e = v
let x = e in m
τ−→ m[v/x]
GrE
~e = v
l〈e〉.m l〈v〉−−−→ m
GrQ
l(x).m
l〈v〉−−−→ m[v/x]
Rec
rec X.m
τ−→ m[rec X.m/X]
Ch1
m
α−→ m′
m + n
α−→ m′
Instrumentation
Mon
s
η−→ r m η−→ n
s / m
η−→ r / n
Ter
s
η−→ r m 6η−→ m 6τ−→
s / m
η−→ r / 0
AsS
s
τ−→ r
s / m
τ−→ r / m
AsM
m
τ−→ n
s / m
τ−→ s / n
Figure 1 A Model for describing Instrumented Systems
and v is an event payload taken from some unspecified value domain v, u ∈ Val. Events capture
a number of computational notions such as inputs/outputs in message-passing programs [22], or
method/function calls and returns [13, 38]. To simplify our technical development, we consider
monadic (i.e., single-valued) events but the formalism can be extended to accommodate polyadicity.
Systems may be described as Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) [2, 34], triples 〈Sys,Act,−→〉
consisting of a set of states, s, r ∈ Sys, a set of actions, α, β ∈ Act = Evt ∪ {τ} that include all
observable events Evt and a distinguished silent action τ < Evt for unobservable events, and a
transition relation, −→⊆ (Sys × Act × Sys). The suggestive notation s α−→ s′ denotes (s, α, s′) ∈−→,
whereas s 6α−→ denotes ¬(∃s′ · s α−→ s′). As usual, we write s =⇒ s′ in lieu of s( τ−→)∗s′ and s η=⇒ s′
for s =⇒ · η−→ · =⇒ s′, referring to s′ as a η-derivative of s; s t=⇒ stands for ∃s′ · s t=⇒ s′. We let traces,
t, u ∈ Evt∗, range over (finite) sequences of observable events and write s η1=⇒ . . . ηn=⇒ sn as s t=⇒ sn,
where t = η1, . . . , ηn. The notation u . . . is occasionally used to denote the existence of some trace t
with a prefix u.
We presuppose an expression language e, d ∈ Exp that ranges over the (event) value domain Val
and a denumerable set of expression variables x, y, z ∈ Vars; ~e and ~x resp. denote lists of expressions
and variables. We also assume a boolean expression language b, c ∈ BExp defined over Exp that
includes standard constructs for conjunctions, b∧c, and negations, ¬b, but also equality predicates over
expressions e=d. The meta-functions fv(e) and fv(b) return the free variables in the resp. expressions;
expressions are closed whenever fv(e) = ∅ and open otherwise, and similarly for boolean expressions.
Valuations are total maps from variables to values, ρ ∈ (Vars→ Val) whereas substitutions are partial
maps from variables to expressions σ ∈ (Vars ⇀ Exp); substitutions are denoted as [~e/~x], where
d[~e/~x] represents the (simultaneous) substitution of all occurrences of xi ∈ ~x in d by the corresponding
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ei ∈ ~e. We assume an evaluation function that takes an expression and a valuation and returns a
value, ~eρ = v. Similarly, boolean expressions have a semantic function mapping them to the
boolean domain via a valuation, ~bρ ∈ {true, false}, where we presume the expected properties,
e.g., ~(b∧c)ρ = true iff ~bρ = true and ~cρ = true. We also assume a classical interpretation of
boolean expressions, i.e., ~(¬b)ρ = true iff ~bρ = false. To alleviate the presentation, we often
work up to associativity and commutativity for conjunctions, treating 〈BExp,∧, true〉 as an abelian
monoid. For closed expressions, we elide the valuation and write ~e and ~b for ~eρ and ~bρ resp.
The satisfiability judgement for boolean expressions, sat(b) def= ∃ρ · ~bρ = true, plays a central role
in subsequent development.
Monitors, here defined by the syntax in Fig. 1, constitute the focus of our study. They may reach
two kinds of verdicts, Verd. Conclusive verdicts consist of acceptances, >, and rejections, ⊥. In
addition, a monitor may also reach the inconclusive verdict, 0, a form of premature termination
used when the generated system events of the monitor specification itself does not yield sufficient
information so as to reach a definite conclusion. The monitor expression guard l〈e〉.m expects events
with label l and a payload value matching the evaluation of e, whereas the quantified guard l(x).m
allows the monitor to dynamically learn the payload of an event with label l. Monitors may branch
(externally) depending on the events observed, m + n, or branch (internally) based on data predicates,
if b thenm else n. They may also perform internal computation themselves by evaluating expressions,
let x = e in m, or recurse, rec X.p, via term variables X,Y,Z ∈ TVars. The constructs l(x).m and
rec X.m act as binders for x and X resp. in m, inducing the usual notions of open/closed (monitor)
terms. We work up to alpha-conversion of bound expression/term variables and use the shorthand
if b thenm for if b thenm else 0 and τ.m for let x = v in m where x < fv(m).
The semantics of closed monitors is also defined in terms of an LTS, via the transition rules in
Fig. 1: for each m ∈ Mon we have a dedicated LTS 〈M,Act,−→〉 where M ⊆ Mon are the monitors
reachable from m via transitions. The rules model the monitor analysis of observable events. Rule
Ver describes how verdicts are irrevocable, meaning that a verdict can analyse any observable
event but always transition to itself. In rule GrE, an expression guard l〈e〉.m only transitions to the
continuation m when observing an event matching the label l with the payload equal to ~e. By
contrast, a quantified guard l(x).m transitions by analysing any event with label l, binding x to the
event payload v in the continuation, m[v/x]; see rule GrQ. The remaining rules are as expected where
the term m[rec X.m/X] denotes the term substitution of rec X.m for free occurrences of X in m.
A system s instrumented with a monitor m is referred to as a monitored system and denoted as
s / m. The semantics of monitored systems is defined by the instrumentation rules in Fig. 1. We
here adopt the composition relation studied in [22, 23], even though other instrumentation relations
could have been used. Note that the chosen composition relation is still quite general: it is parametric
wrt. the system and monitor abstract LTSs and it is largely independent of their specific language
specifications, since it only requires the monitor LTS to contain an inconclusive (persistent) verdict
state, 0. The instrumentation relation of Fig. 1 is asymmetric: a monitored system can transition
with an observable event only when the system can produce that event i.e., monitors are passive and
cannot instigate transitions. When the system generates an (observable) event that can be analysed by
the monitor, the two transition in lockstep according to their respective LTSs (rule Mon). When the
monitor cannot analyse the event generated 1 and cannot internally transition to a state that enables it
to do so (i.e., it is already stable, m 6τ−→), the instrumentation does not block the monitored system:
instead, it allows the system to transition but aborts monitoring to the inconclusive verdict (rule
Ter). System-monitor synchronisations are limited to observable events, and the specific entities can
transition independently wrt. their respective internal moves (rules AsS and AsM).
1 This may be due to a number of reasons, such as event knowledge gaps or knowledge disagreements [6].
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I Example 2. Monitor m4 below listens for input and output events in〈v〉 and out〈v〉 where the
(integer) payload v ∈ N reports the port number over which the communication operation is performed.
m4 , rec X.
( (
out〈80〉.⊥) + (in(x). if x=80 then out〈81〉.> else out〈x〉.X ) ) (1)
The monitor rejects system executions starting with an output on port 80 but accepts traces containing
an input on port 80 followed by an output on port 81, preceded by an arbitrary number of input-output
operations on any matching port other than 80. The execution below shows an accepted monitored
computation for a system s generating the trace in〈85〉 · out〈85〉 · in〈80〉 · out〈81〉. In monitor m4, the
binding on in(x) acts as a freeze-variable [19] for the subsequent out〈x〉 guard in the else branch.
s / m4
τ−→ s / (out〈80〉.⊥) + (in(x). if x=80 then out〈81〉.> else out〈x〉.m4) Rec
in〈85〉−−−→s′ / if 85=80 then out〈81〉.> else out〈85〉.m4 ChR+GrQ
τ−→ s′ / out〈85〉.m4 out〈85〉−−−−→ s′′ / m4 in〈80〉·out〈81〉=========⇒ s′′′ / > IfF, . . .
The instrumentation of Fig. 1 delays system transitions to allow the monitor to internally transition to
a state that can process the event. E.g., if a system r can generate event out〈80〉, r / m4 postpones
this transition (Mon and Ter cannot be applied) until m4 unfolds.
r / m4
τ−→ r / (out〈80〉.⊥) + (in(x). if x=80 then . . .) out〈80〉−−−−−→ r′ / ⊥ AsM,Mon
Rule Ter is crucial both for allowing monitored computations to proceed when the monitor cannot
analyse an event, but also to avoid unintended detections. E.g., if system r can generate the trace
out〈90〉 · in〈80〉 ·out〈81〉, this behaviour should still be permitted when instrumented with the monitor
m4, but the behaviour should not be detected according to the description in Eq. (1). After the initial
unfolding of m4, Ter allows r to transition with out〈90〉 but transitions m4 to the inconclusive state, 0,
since neither guard out〈80〉 nor guard in(x) can process the event.
r / m4
τ−→ r / (out〈80〉.⊥) + (in(x). if x=80 then . . .) out〈90〉−−−−→ r′′ / 0 in〈80〉·out〈81〉=========⇒ r′′′ / 0 AsM, Ter, . . .
Had rule Ter been designed otherwise (leaving the monitor state unaltered when transiting with
out〈90〉) the ensuing events in〈80〉 ·out〈81〉 would lead to the unintended acceptance of the trace. J
3 Deterministic Monitoring Behaviour
In a monitored system, non-deterministic behaviour can be caused by either the system or the monitor.
We focus on identifying non-determinism attributed to monitors, teasing it apart from non-determinism
caused by system behaviour. This is motivated by the fact that, generally, one has limited control over
the behaviour of a system under scrutiny. We target a definition that admits monitor non-determinism
that is not externally observable. Concretely, we consider detections (i.e., conclusive verdicts) as
the only externally visible aspect of a monitor and base our definition on the notion of deterministic
detections—in applications such as RV, detections are associated with property satisfactions and
violations [23, 7]. This immediately rules out a number of candidate definitions for deterministic
monitor behaviour. For instance, a definition that considers a monitor m to be deterministic whenever,
for all systems s and traces t, s / m
t
=⇒ s′ / m′ and s / m t=⇒ s′ / m′′ implies m′ = m′′ is too stringent:
it precludes the monitor description below (a slight modification on m1 of E.g. 1)
m5 , chl(x).
((
let y = enc(x) in aut〈y〉.ack〈y〉.>) + (aut〈enc(x)〉.ack〈enc(x)〉.>)) (2)
even though m5 deterministically accepts traces of the form chl〈v1〉·aut〈v2〉·ack〈v2〉where v2 =enc(v1).
In fact, after an event chl〈v〉 (for some value v), monitor m5 can reach two possible internal states,
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namely
(
let y = enc(v) in aut〈y〉.ack〈y〉.>) + (aut〈enc(v)〉.ack〈enc(v)〉.>) or aut〈v′〉.ack〈v′〉.> where
v′=enc(v). Other candidates (e.g., confluence defined over transitions [25, 40]) are either inadequate
or not immediately applicable because they do not account for executions that do not lead to detections.
E.g., m6 (below) would not be confluent (consider event in〈81〉), even though it consistently rejects
any trace with the prefix u=in〈80〉 (and consistently does not detect all the other traces).
m6 ,
(
in〈80〉.⊥) + ((in〈81〉.out〈81〉.0) + (in〈81〉.out〈81〉.in〈82〉.0)) (3)
I Definition 3 (Detected Computations). The transition sequence
s / m
t
=⇒ s0 / m0 τ−→ s1 / m1 τ−→ s2 / m2 τ−→ . . .
is called a t-computation if it is maximal i.e., either it is infinite or it is finite and cannot be extended
further using τ-transitions. The t-computation above is called accepted whenever ∃i ∈ N ·mi = > and
rejected when ∃i ∈ N· mi = ⊥. A detected t-computation is either an accepted or a rejected one. J
Detected computations are indexed by their trace to allow us to partition computations according
to the system behaviour exhibited at runtime, thus accounting for system non-determinism. Def. 3
also permits monitors to stabilise and reach verdicts in the trailing τ-sequence following a t-trace.
I Definition 4 (Deterministic Detection and Withholding). Monitor m deterministically accepts
(resp. deterministically rejects) for system s along trace t ∈ Evt∗, denoted as da(m, s, t) and dr(m, s, t)
resp., iff all t-computation from s / m are accepting (resp. rejecting). Monitor m deterministically
detects for s along t, dd(m, s, t), whenever da(m, s, t) or dr(m, s, t). Monitor m deterministically
withholds for s along trace t, dw(m, s, t), iff no t-computation from s / m is accepting or rejecting. J
I Example 5. For arbitrary system s, monitors m1 of E.g. 1 and m5 of Eq. (2) deterministically accept
traces with the prefix t = chl〈v1〉.aut〈v2〉.ack〈v2〉 where v2=enc(v1) and deterministically withhold
on all the other traces. Monitor m2 deterministically rejects traces with the prefix t above when
v2,enc(v1) but does not deterministically detect traces with prefix t when v2=enc(v1). For arbitrary s,
monitor m3 deterministically detects any trace with the above prefix t (accepting or rejecting the trace
depending on whether v2 = enc(v1) or not) and deterministically withholds otherwise. For any system
s, monitor m4 of E.g. 2 satisfies dr(m4, s, t) when the trace t is of the form t = out〈80〉 . . ., da(m4, s, t)
when t =
(
in〈vi〉 · out〈vi〉)i · in〈80〉 · out〈81〉 . . . for some i ∈ N, and dw(m4, s, t) otherwise. Similarly,
for all systems s, m6 satisfies dr(m, s, t) when t = in〈80〉 . . . and dw(m, s, t) otherwise. J
For the rest of our study, monitors with deterministic behaviour are defined as consistently-detecting.
I Definition 6 (Consistent Detection). Monitor m consistently detects for system s, denoted as
cd(m, s) iff for all traces t we have dd(m, s, t) or dw(m, s, t). A monitor m is consistently-detecting,
denoted as cd(m), whenever cd(m, s) holds for any system s. J
I Example 7. Monitors m1,m3,m4,m5 and m6 are consistently-detecting, but m2 is not. Def. 6 does
not require monitors to perform any detections. The monitor m7 , rec X.
(
in〈81〉.X) + (in〈81〉.out〈81〉.X)
can consistently analyse an infinite number of traces for any s, cd(m7), even though it never flags. J
A few comments are in order. First, Def. 6 abstracts away from the particular instances of the
systems considered, the specifics of the monitor language and instrumentation mechanism used; this
makes is applicable to arbitrary monitoring setups. Second, cd(m, s) may be seen as requiring an
ambiguity of d=1 from automata theory [29, 4], for the observable behaviour specified in Def. 4. Our
setting is however more general, allowing for infinite states and alphabets (actions). Moreover, cd(m)
quantifies over all possible system compositions. Third, since Def. 6 is defined over monitored system
behaviour, it allows us to assess the actual monitor behaviour at runtime. Particularly, the system
quantification in cd(m) accounts for any (indirect) effects of a system on the execution of a monitor.
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I Example 8. Whereas monitor m8 , in〈81〉.⊥ is (trivially) consistently-detecting in the framework
of Fig. 1, the monitor m9 , in(x).if x = 81 then⊥ else 0 is, perhaps surprisingly, not. Consider a
(diverging) system s with behaviour s
in〈81〉−−−−−→ s′ τ−→ s′. Although s / m9 can reject the t-computation
for t=in〈81〉, another possible t-computation of s / m9 is
s / m9
in〈81〉−−−−→ (s′ / if 81=81 then⊥ else 0) τ−→ (s′ / if 81=81 then⊥ else 0) τ−→ . . .
which never reaches a verdict. Therefore, we have ¬cd(m9) according to Def. 6. J
Fourth, consistently-detecting monitors are not compositional, affecting the subsequent machinery.
I Example 9. Although m8 (from E.g. 8) and monitor m10 = in〈81〉.> are both consistently-detecting
according to Def. 6, their composition, i.e., m8 + m10, is clearly not. J
4 Controllability
In spite of its generality and intuitive nature, Def. 6 it is hard to automate directly as a correctness
analysis. One major obstacle is the inherent universal quantification over systems and traces defining
cd(m). In this section, we set out to give an alternative definition for describing consistently-detecting
monitors that does not suffer from these shortcomings. It is based on the notion of controllability
[20, 31] which, in discrete event settings, roughly refers to the ability to steer a (passive) entity
to designated terminal states via a series of admissible controls. In our case, the monitors will
constitute the passive entities to be steered, whereas the monitored systems assume the controller’s
role: the admissible controls are effectively the observable events in a monitoring setup that cause the
monitor to transition, whereas the terminal states of interest are the conclusive verdicts. The proposed
definition thus inverts the focus from how a system is monitored to how a monitor can be driven.
Before giving the actual definition, we first need to lift the technical machinery of Fig. 1 to sets
of monitors, M,N ⊆ Mon: this allows us to express the status whereby a monitor that can be in a
number of potential states after being driven by a sequence of steering controls, which facilitates the
analysis of non-compositional properties such as ours (see E.g. 9).
I Definition 10. A monitor-set M potentially reaches a verdict w, pr(M,w), when ∃m ∈ M ·m =⇒ w,
and potentially analyses an event η, pa(M, η), when ∃m ∈ M · m η=⇒. Function aft(M, η) is defined as:
aft(M, η) def=
⋃
m∈Maft(m, η) aft(m, η)
def
= { n | m =⇒ · η−→ n }∪{ 0 | ∃n·m =⇒ n 6τ−→ and n 6η−→} J
Intuitively, aft(M, η) computes the set of reachable states from every m ∈ M when it is asked by
the instrumentation of Fig. 1 to analyse an event η. The two conditions defining aft(m, η) correspond
to the monitored system transitions dictated by the respective rules Mon and Ter in Fig. 1.
I Definition 11 (Controllability). A relation R ⊆ P(Mon) is controllable iff for all M ∈ R:
1. pr(M,w) and w ∈ {>,⊥} implies M = {w};
2. pa(M, η) implies aft(M, η) ∈ R.
Controllability, denoted as the relation C, is the largest controllable relation. A monitor m (resp.
monitor-set M) is said to be controllable iff {m} ∈ C (resp. M ∈ C). J
Controllability is coinductive: to show that a monitor m is controllable, i.e., {m} ∈ C, it suffices to
provide a witness controllable relation R such that {m} ∈ R. Condition (i) in Def. 11 requires that if
some m ∈ M can reach a conclusive verdict, then every m′ ∈ M must be able to do so immediately,
without requiring any preceding τ-moves (hence M = {w}); this rules out the possibility of inconsistent
detections and, at the same time, prohibits diverging systems from interfering with the reaching of
such verdicts (see E.g. 8). Condition (ii) in Def. 11 intuitively requires that this condition is satisfied
for any event η observed, by all the states that any m ∈ M may transition to when analysing η.
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I Example 12. We can show that m6 (Eq. (3)) is controllable via the controllable relation R1 below:
R1 =
{ {m6} , {>} , {0, in〈82〉.0} , {0} ,
{out〈81〉.0, out〈81〉.in〈82〉.0}
}
R2 =
{ {m7} , {m7, out〈81〉.m7} , {0,m7} ,
{0,m7, out〈81〉.m7} , {0}
}
Note that {m6} ∈ R1. We can also finitely determine that the recursive monitor m7 (E.g. 7) is con-
trollable via the relation R2. The reader may want to check that R2 is controllable. For instance,
aft({m7, out〈81〉.m7} , in〈81〉) = {0,m7, out〈81〉.m7}, aft({m7, out〈81〉.m7} , out〈81〉) = {0,m7} and,
importantly, aft({0,m7, out〈81〉.m7} , in〈81〉) = {0,m7, out〈81〉.m7} itself. J
Controllability coincides with Def. 6: we can use Def. 11 as a sound and complete proof technique
to determine whether a monitor m satisfies cd(m), side-stepping universal quantifications over systems.
I Theorem 13 (Consistent Detection Full Abstraction). cd(m) iff {m} ∈ C J
I Example 14. As a result of Thm. 13, we can show that m6 and m7 are consistently-detecting via
the controllable relations R1 and R2 of E.g. 12. We can also indirectly show that ¬cd(m8 + m10) from
E.g. 9, by arguing that there cannot be a controllable relation R with {m8 + m10} ∈ R. For suppose
that such an R exists. By Def. 11(ii) the monitor-set aft({m8 + m10} , in〈81〉) = {>,⊥} must also be in
R; this, in turn, would necessarily mean that R is not controllable since {>,⊥} violates Def. 11(i). J
5 Symbolic Controllability
Controllability, Def. 11, is still not adequate for a fully automated analysis of consistently-detecting
monitors. Particularly, whenever the resp. event value domain is infinite, quantified guards induce an
infinite number of transitions, e.g., l(x).m generates a transition with the label l〈v〉 for every v ∈ Val
(see rule GrQ). As a result, condition Def. 11(ii) may require the monitor analysis to consider a
potentially infinite number of monitor-set states whenever monitor descriptions use quantified guards.
To this end, we define a symbolic semantics over both open2 and closed monitor terms using
symbolic events, θ ∈ SEvt. These are similar to the events of Sec. 2 except that they carry variables
instead of values as payloads, l〈x〉. Symbolic transitions, m µ−→
b
n are defined by the rules in Fig. 2,
where µ ∈ SEvt ∪ {τ} ranges over both symbolic and τ events, and the boolean expression b records
the condition under which the LTS action may take place. For instance, the term rec X.m may unfold
in all circumstances (i.e., b = true in rule sRec) whereas the term if b thenm else n can either
τ-transition to m when b holds, or to n when the converse, ¬b, holds (rules sIfT and sIfF). The other
key rules in Fig. 2 are sGrE and sGrQ: the former transitions with a symbolic event l〈x〉 under the
condition x=e, whereas the latter transitions with a similar symbolic event under any circumstance.
Fig. 2 also defines rules for weak symbolic transitions, m
θ
=⇒
b
p n, and reductions, m =⇒
b
n, where
both relations aggregate boolean constraints via conjunctions. Note that weak symbolic transitions
describe transition sequences where τ-transitions must precede the (final) symbolic event transition.
The predicate m 6µ−−→ denotes 6∃ b, n · m µ−→
b
n whereas m
θ
=⇒
b
p stands for ∃n · m θ=⇒
b
p n.
A constrained monitor-set 〈b,M〉 is a tuple where every m ∈ M may be open, and b is a condition
constraining free variables in M. Every 〈b,M〉 abstractly represents a (potentially infinite) set of
closed monitor-sets for every valuation ρ satisfying b,
{mρ | ~bρ = true and m ∈ M } (4)
2 Open wrt. expression variables x, y, . . . ∈ Vars not term variables X,Y . . . ∈ TVars.
A. Francalanza 4:9
In this sense, the monitor-sets in Sec. 4 are special cases of constrained monitor-sets where b = true
and M is closed. Note that whenever ¬sat(b), the constrained monitor-set 〈b,M〉 denotes the empty
set of monitor-sets, ∅, which is trivially controllable by Def. 11. We lift functions such as that for free
variables fv(−) to constrained monitor-sets in the obvious manner, e.g., fv(〈b,M〉) def= fv(b) ∪ fv(M).
I Example 15. The constrained monitor-set 〈x ≥ 3, {if x = 2 then> else ⊥}〉 abstractly describes
all monitor-sets {if x = 2 then> else ⊥} ρ where ρ(x) ≥ 3. For any such ρ, no monitor of the form
(if x = 2 then> else ⊥)ρ can transition to a > verdict according to the concrete semantics of Fig. 1.
Symbolically, this may be expressed as ¬sat(x ≥ 3∧x = 2). J
We abstractly model controllability, Def. 11, in terms of constrained monitor-sets, the symbolic
semantics of Fig. 2 and the satisfiability judgement sat(b) defined earlier in Sec. 2.
I Definition 16. A constrained monitor-set 〈b,M〉 potentially reaches a verdict w, denoted as
spr
(〈b,M〉,w), whenever ∃m ∈ M, c · m =⇒
c
w and sat(b∧c). Moreover, 〈b,M〉 potentially analyses a
symbolic event θ along c, denoted as spa
(〈b,M〉, θ, c), whenever ∃m ∈ M · m θ=⇒
c
p and sat(b∧c). J
Defining the symbolic counterpart to aft(M, η) of Def. 10 is less straightforward. Intuitively, from
all the valuations ρ satisfying (and represented by) b in 〈b,M〉, only a subset of them may satisfy the
condition c in a potentially-analyses judgement spa(〈b,M〉, θ, c) from Def. 16. A correct modelling
of Def. 11 therefore requires us to take this fact into account.
I Example 17. Consider the constrained monitor-set 〈true,M〉 where M = {m10,m11} and
m10 , if x=2 then k〈1〉.> else k〈1〉.⊥ m11 , if x≤1∨x≥3 then k〈1〉.⊥ else k〈1〉.>
It turns out that for any ρ satisfying true, Mρ is controllable. Therefore, for the judgement
spa(〈true,M〉, k〈y〉, (x=2∧y=1)) of Def. 16, which holds since m10
k〈y〉
======⇒
x=2∧y=1
p and sat(true∧x=2∧y=1),
the reachable states to be considered by a corresponding symbolic analysis (modelling De f . 11(ii))
should not include the residual state ⊥, even though it may be reached after the event k〈y〉 with y=1
(see rule sGrE). The reason for this is that the conditions required to symbolically reach this state, i.e.,
(¬(x=2)∧y=1) or ((x≤1 ∨ x≥3)∧y=1), cannot be satisfied by any ρ that also satisfies the spa(−)
condition (x=2∧y=1). Symbolically, this may be expressed as ¬sat((x=2∧y=1)∧((¬(x=2)∧y=1)))
and ¬sat((x=2∧y=1)∧((x≤1 ∨ x≥3)∧y=1)). J
The complications elicited in E.g. 17 are even more intricate. For instance, for a particular
judgement spa(〈b,M〉, θ, c), one could have some m1,m2 ∈ M whereby mi θ=⇒
ci
p m′i and sat(b∧c∧ci) for
i ∈ {1, 2}, but at the same time having c1 and c2 being incompatible with one another, i.e., ¬sat(c1∧c2).
In such cases, the respective residual states m′1 and m
′
2 should be analysed separately.
I Definition 18. The relevant conditions for a monitor-set M wrt. a symbolic event θ are:
rc(M, θ) def= { c | ∃m ∈ M · (m θ=⇒
c
p or ∃n · (m =⇒
c
n and n 6τ−−→ and n 6 θ−−→)) }
The satisfiability combinations for a condition-set {c1, . . . , cn} wrt. a condition b are:
sc(b, {c1, . . . , cn}) def= { {b, c′1, . . . , c′n} | ∀i ∈ 1..n · (c′i =ci or c′i =¬ci) }
The reachable constrained monitor-sets from 〈b,M〉 after θ with condition c are:
saft(〈b,M〉, θ, c) def= { 〈∧B, saft(M, B, θ)〉 | B ∈ sc(b∧c, rc(M, θ)) and sat(∧B) }
saft(M, B, θ) def=
 n ∃m ∈ M, c · sat((∧B) ∧ c) and(m θ=⇒
c
p n or (∃n′ · m =⇒
c
n′ 6τ−−→ and n′ 6 θ−−→ and n = 0))
 J
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Symbolic Transitions
sVer
w
η−−→
true
w
sIfT
if b thenm else n
τ−→
b
m
sIfF
if b thenm else n
τ−→
¬b
n
sRec
rec X.m
τ−−→
true
m[rec X.m/X]
sCh1
m
µ−→
b
m′
m + n
µ−→
b
m′
sCh2
n
µ−→
b
n′
m + n
µ−→
b
n′
sGrE
l〈e〉.m l〈x〉−−−→
e=x
m
sGrQ
l(y).m
l〈x〉−−−→
true
m[x/y]
sLet
let x = e in m
τ−−→
true
m[e/x]
Weak Symbolic Transitions and Reductions
sWTr1
m
θ−→
b
m′
m
θ
=⇒
b
p m′
sWTr2
m
τ−→
b
m′ m′
θ
=⇒
c
p m′′
m
θ
==⇒
b∧c
p m′′
sWRd1
m ==⇒
true
m
sWTr2
m
τ−→
b
m′ m′ =⇒
c
m′′
m ==⇒
b∧c
m′′
Figure 2 A Symbolic Semantics for Monitors
In Def. 18, the relevant conditions for M wrt. θ, denoted as rc(M, θ), are all the symbolic conditions
that need to be considered to assess the reachable states from M for the symbolic event θ — they are
the symbolic counterpart to the transition sequences defining aft(m, η) in Def. 10. The satisfiability
combinations of a condition-set B wrt. a condition b, denoted as sc(b, B), capture the maximal
condition subsets in B that any valuation ρ satisfying condition b also satisfies. Every condition set B′
returned by sc(b, B) contains b itself and one condition c′ for every boolean condition c ∈ B (either
c itself or its negation); these combination sets partition all the valuations ρ satisfying b. Symbolic
reachability for 〈b,M〉 after θ with condition c, saft(〈b,M〉, θ, c) in Def. 18, is defined wrt. all the
satisfiability combinations B of rc(M, θ) for the (fixed) condition b∧c. Although sc(b∧c, rc(M, θ))
partitions all the ρ satisfying b∧c, some of these partitions are empty. Accordingly, saft(〈b,M〉, θ, c)
only considers the non-empty partitions via the satisfiability condition sat(∧B), where ∧B returns the
syntactic conjunction formula c1∧. . .∧cn for a boolean set B = {c1, . . . , cn}.
It is worth remarking that the symbolic LTS of Fig. 2, is image-finite [42], and thus finitely
branching when considering the τ-transition graph of a term m. By König’s Infinity Lemma [33] the
set of constraints { c | m θ=⇒
c
p or ∃n · (m =⇒
c
n and n 6τ−−→ and n 6 θ−−→) } must be finite and, as a result,
rc(M, θ) is finite too for a finite monitor-set M. This ensures that saft(〈b,M〉, θ, c) is well-defined.
IDefinition 19 (Symbolic Controllability). The relationS ⊆ (BExp × P(Mon)) is called a symbolically-
controllable relation iff for all constrained monitor-sets 〈b,M〉 ∈ S:
1. spr(〈b,M〉,w) and w ∈ {>,⊥} implies M = {w};
2. spa(〈b,M〉, l〈x〉, c) where frsh(fv(〈b,M〉)= x implies saft(〈b,M〉, l〈x〉, c) ⊆ S.
Symbolic Controllability, denoted as Csym, is the largest symbolically-controllable relation. A (closed)
monitor m is symbolically-controllable iff 〈true, {m}〉 ∈ Csym. J
The clause Def. 19(ii) assumes a function frsh(V) that (deterministically) returns the next fresh
variable x that is not in the variable set V . When compared to Def. 11(ii), this allows us to just
consider one (symbolic) event, l〈x〉, for a finite set of constraints, as opposed to a potentially infinite
set of events, i.e., l〈v〉 for every v ∈ Val.
I Example 20. Recall m10 and m11 from E.g. 17. The monitor m12 , l(x).m10 + l(x).m11 can be
shown to be symbolically-controllable via the relation S1 defined below, where b1 = (x = 2∧y = 1),
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b2 = (¬(x=2)∧y=1), b3 = ((x≤1∨x≥3)∧y=1) and b4 = (¬(x≤1∨x≥3)∧y=1); these are obtained
from the relevant conditions rc({m10,m11} , k〈y〉) = {b1, b2, b3, b4}.
S1 =

〈true, {m12}〉, 〈true, {m10,m11}〉,
〈(true∧b1)∧b1¬b2∧¬b3∧b4, {>}〉, 〈(true∧b4)∧b1∧¬b2∧¬b3∧b4, {>}〉,
〈(true∧b2)∧¬b1∧b2∧b3∧¬b4, {⊥}〉, 〈(true∧b3)∧¬b1∧b2∧b3∧¬b4, {⊥}〉

For illustrative purposes, we do not simplify the constraints in the constrained monitor-sets of S
to show how these are derived. E.g., 〈(true∧b1)∧b1¬b2∧¬b3∧b4, {>}〉 is obtained as a result of
saft(〈true, {m10,m11}〉, l〈x〉, true∧b1). In fact, the combination {(true∧b1), b1,¬b2,¬b3, b4} is the only
satisfiable condition-set and all the others are filtered out by saft(〈true, {m10,m11}〉, l〈x〉, true∧b1). J
Symbolic Controllability, Def. 19, is sound and complete wrt. Controllability, Def. 11.
I Theorem 21 (Controllability Full Abstraction). {m} ∈ C iff 〈true, {m}〉 ∈ Csym J
I Example 22. Recall m3 , chl(x).m′3 from E.g. 1, recast in terms of m
′
3 defined below as:
m′3 , let y=enc(x) in
(
aut〈y〉.ack〈y〉.> + aut(z).if z , y then ack(z′).⊥ else ack〈z〉.>)
E.g. 7 stated that m3 is consistently-detecting. This fact is hard to determine using Def. 6, whereas
analyses using Def. 11 are complicated by quantifications over the values of events. By Thms. 13
and 21, we can show that m3 is consistently-detecting via the symbolic controllability relation:
S2 =

〈true, {m3}〉, 〈true,m′3〉 ,
〈z = enc(x), {ack〈enc(x)〉.>, if z,enc(x) then ack(z′).⊥ else ack〈z〉.>}〉 ,
〈(z = enc(x))∧(w = z)∧(w = enc(x)), {>}〉,
〈¬(z = enc(x)), {if z,enc(x) then ack(z′).⊥ else ack〈z〉.>}〉 , 〈¬(z = enc(x)), {⊥}〉

In S2 and the ensuing discussion, we alleviate our presentation by simplifying the boolean conditions
used, e.g., we simply write (z = enc(x)) in lieu of
(
true∧(z = enc(x))). We highlight a few points.
First, consider the second constrained monitor-set in S2, namely 〈true,m′3〉. Since the semantics
of Fig. 2 allows expression guards and quantified guards to transition with the same symbolic event
(albeit with different conditions) we are able to consider the resp. continuations in unison for the
event aut〈z〉. Concretely, according to Def. 19(ii), for spa(〈true,m′3〉, aut〈z〉, (z=enc(x))) generated
by the expression guard weak transition of m′3, we need to ensure that the resulting monitor-set
〈z = enc(x), saft(
{
m′3
}
, {(z = enc(x)), true} , aut〈z〉)〉 (which evaluates to the third constrained monitor-
set in S2) is also in the symbolic relation. At the same time, for spa(〈true,m′3〉, aut〈z〉, true) generated
by the quantified guard weak transition of m′3, we need to ensure that two monitor-sets are in
S2, namely 〈z = enc(x), saft(
{
m′3
}
, {(z = enc(x)), true} , aut〈z〉)〉 (as before) but also the constrained
monitor-set 〈¬(z = enc(x)), saft(
{
m′3
}
, {¬(z = enc(x)), true} , aut〈z〉)〉 (which evaluates to the fifth
constrained monitor-set in S2).
The second point we highlight about S2 concerns its third constrained monitor-set. In par-
ticular, the left branch of the conditional term in this set, namely ack(z′).⊥ in the term if z ,
enc(x) then ack(z′).⊥ else ack〈z〉.>, is not considered by our analysis since its condition, z,enc(x),
is incompatible with the constraining condition of the monitor-set, i.e., ¬sat((z = enc(x))∧(z,enc(x))).
Third, we also note how the condition aggregation mechanism for the consecutive symbolic
events aut〈z〉 and ack〈w〉— transferring us from the second constrained monitor-set, 〈true,m′3〉, to
the fourth, 〈(z = enc(x))∧(w = z)∧(w = enc(x)), {>}〉, via the third constrained monitor-set in S2
— enables us to symbolically relate the expression guards in m3, which impose a condition such as
(z = enc(x)) upon transition, with the quantified guard that imposes the same condition after the
transition (by means of a conditional branch in its continuation). We leave it up to the interested
reader to check that the remaining monitor-sets in S2 satisfy the conditions required by Def. 19. J
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6 On Automating Symbolic Controllability
Despite its merits, a direct implementation of the symbolic controllability from Def. 19 still would
not perform well for certain recursive monitor descriptions, as shown in the following example.
I Example 23. Recall monitor m4 from E.g. 2. To show that it is controllable, we need to exhibit a
symbolic relation that includes 〈true, {m4}〉. For some fresh variable x where frsh(fv(〈true, {m4}〉) = x,
since the judgement spa(〈true, {m4}〉, in〈x〉, true) holds, this relation needs to include the ensuing
monitor-set 〈true,
{
m′4
}
〉 as well, where m′4 , if x=80 then out〈81〉.> else out〈x〉.m4. In turn, since
spa
(〈true, {m′4}〉, out〈y〉, (¬(x = 80)∧y = x)) (where frsh(fv(〈b, {m′4}〉) = y), the symbolic relation
must also contain 〈¬(x = 80)∧y = x, {m4}〉. We thus reach the original monitor set {m4} but with a
stronger condition, namely ¬(x=80)∧y= x. By extension of this reasoning, it is not hard to see that
the symbolic relation required by Def. 19 needs to be infinitely large. J
The problem exhibited by E.g. 23 is that the condition aggregating mechanism of Def. 19 does
not specify any means for consolidating the boolean condition b constraining a monitor set M in
〈b,M〉, i.e., a form of garbage collection of redundant conditions. For instance, in the constrained
monitor-set 〈¬(x=80)∧y= x, {m4}〉 of E.g. 23, the condition (¬(x=80)∧y = x) plays no effective role
in constraining the free variables in {m4}, of which there are none. We therefore optimise Def. 19 in a
sound (and complete) manner by taking into consideration boolean sub-conditions that can be isolated
and discarded. This leads to an improved automated analysis for consistently-detecting monitors.
I Definition 24 (Optimised Symbolic Controllability). The consolidation of a boolean expression b
wrt. a variable set V , denoted as cns(b,V), is defined as:
cns(b,V) def= b1 whenever prt(b,V) = 〈b1, b2〉 for some b2
where the boolean expression partitioning operation prt(b,V) is defined as:
prt(b,V) def=
〈b1, b2〉 if sat(b) and b = b1∧b2 and
(
fv(b1) ⊆ V) and (V∩fv(b2)=∅)
〈b, true〉 otherwise
Let the optimised symbolic reachability from 〈b,M〉 for θ and c, osaft(〈b,M〉, θ, c), be defined as:
osaft(〈b,M〉, θ, c) def=
{
〈cns(∧B,V), saft(M, B, θ)〉 B ∈ sc(b∧c, rc(M, θ)) and sat(∧B)
and V = fv(saft(M, B, θ))
}
A relation S ⊆ (BExp × P(Mon)) is called optimised symbolically-controllable iff for all 〈b,M〉∈S:
1. spr(〈b,M〉,w) and w ∈ {>,⊥} implies M = {w};
2. spa(〈b,M〉, l〈x〉, c) where frsh(fv(〈b,M〉))= x implies osaft(〈b,M〉, l〈x〉, c) ⊆ S.
The largest optimised symbolically-controllable relation is denoted by Coptsym. A (closed) monitor m is
said to be optimised symbolically-controllable iff 〈true, {m}〉 ∈ Coptsym. J
We highlight the salient points from Def. 24. First, boolean consolidation in a constrained
monitor-set, 〈cns(b),M〉, should not change the set of concrete monitor sets represented by 〈b,M〉
and, for this reason, we cannot consolidate unsatisfiable boolean conditions. For instance, even
if x< fv(M), it is still unsound to optimise 〈true∧ (x , x),M〉 to 〈true,M〉 based on the fact that
¬sat(x, x). Concretely, from Eq. (4) of Sec. 5 we know that 〈true∧x, x,M〉 denotes the empty set
of monitor-sets, ∅, whereas 〈true,M〉 represents the set {mρ | ~trueρ = true and m ∈ M }. Second,
consolidation should ideally filter out as much redundant constraints as possible, e.g., in 〈b1∧b2,M〉
we should remove b2 whenever fv(b2) ∩ fv(M) = ∅. In Def. 24 we require the strongest possible
condition for the residual condition b1 in 〈b1∧b2,M〉, i.e., fv(b1) ⊆ fv(M), which indirectly implies
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that the resp. condition variables are partitioned fv(b1) ∩ fv(b1) = ∅. This partitioning is crucial for a
sound consolidation, e.g., in 〈(¬(x =80)∧y = x),M〉, it is unsound to just remove the subcondition
¬(x = 80) when x < fv(M) and y ∈ fv(M). Although prt(b,V) can be refined further (while still
observing core requirements for soundness such as variable condition partitioning), in Def. 24 we
opted for a less elaborate condition that suffices our exposition. Third, we highlight the fact that
the conditions specifying cns(b) in Def. 24 yield a unique consolidated condition up to semantic
equivalence meaning that, in an implementation of the framework, this can be defined as a function.
I Theorem 25 (Optimised Controllability). 〈true, {m}〉 ∈ Coptsym iff 〈true, {m}〉 ∈ Csym J
I Example 26. As a result of Thms. 13, 21 and 25, we can show that m4 of E.g. 2 is consistently-
detecting by exhibiting the optimised symbolic relation S3 below (m′4 is the monitor defined earlier in
E.g. 23). For expository purposes, we show how the consolidated boolean expressions are calculated.
In particular, the first constrained monitor-set in S3 denotes both the starting pair 〈true, {m4}〉, but
also the pair 〈cns(x = 80∧y = 81, fv({m4})), {m4}〉.
S3 =
{ 〈 true︸︷︷︸
cns(¬(x=80)∧y=x,∅)
, {m4}〉, 〈 true︸︷︷︸
cns(x=80,∅)
, {⊥}〉, 〈true,
{
m′4
}
〉, 〈 true︸︷︷︸
cns(x=80∧y=81,∅)
, {>}〉 }
The interested reader may check that the conditions of Def. 24 are satisfied by S3. J
Using standard techniques [42, 3], an algorithm constructing symbolically-controllable relations
from Def. 24 can be extracted more easily. Moreover, the completeness aspect in Thms. 13, 21 and 25
should enable such an automation to infer a counter-example (system and trace) from failed attempts,
thereby explaining why a monitor is not consistently-detecting.
I Example 27. Recall monitor m2 from E.g. 1. Assuming the shorthand abbreviations m′2 ,
aut〈y〉.ack〈y〉.> + aut(z).if z , y then ack(z′).⊥ and M = {if z , enc(x) then ack(z′).⊥, ack〈enc(x)〉.>},
compiling a relation satisfying Def. 24 fails because it needs to include:
〈true, {let y=enc(x) in m′2}〉 since spa(〈true, {m2}〉, chl〈x〉, true)
〈z = enc(x),M〉 since spa(〈true, {let y=enc(x) in m′2}〉, aut〈z〉, z = enc(x))
〈true, {>, 0}〉 since spa(〈z = enc(x),M〉, ack〈w〉, (w = enc(x)))
The final pair 〈true, {>, 0}〉 violates Def. 24(i) and, via the symbolic events on right-hand column
conatining the spa(−) assertions that lead to it, one can construct the counter-example inducing the
inconsistent detection, i.e., a system s producing the trace chl〈v〉 ·aut〈u〉 ·ack〈u〉 where u=enc(v). J
7 Conclusion
Monitors should provide guarantees that they will operate correctly when instrumented with any
system [35]. At the same time, for this requirement to be scalable, the corresponding correctness
analysis that determines it must also be compositional: monitors should be verified separately,
independent of the systems they may be instrumented with. The fact that monitors tend to be
considerably smaller (in size and complexity) than the systems they observe further justifies this
point. This paper provides two definitions that formalise deterministic monitoring behaviour, Def. 6
(consistently-detecting monitors) and Def. 11 (controllable monitors), that address these seemingly
conflicting concerns; it also shows that the two definitions coincide, Thm. 13. In addition, the paper
also studies alternative definitions for controllability, Defs. 19 and 24, that enable the implementation
of sound and complete symbolic analyses, Thms. 21 and 25.
Our methods provide a systematic way for factoring out auxiliary reasoning on data from the
analysis relating to the branching structure of the monitors; the former kind of reasoning can be
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determined by calling on an independent satisfiability solver. In fact, for the specific case of our
expository monitor language in Fig. 1, one can show that our methods yield finite symbolic transition
graphs, making the latter reasoning decidable modulo the expression and boolean language used.
The results obtained in this work should also be general enough to be applicable to other monitoring
systems. For instance, Defs. 6, 11, 19 and 24 are independent of the kind of systems monitored,
the syntax of the monitor language, and the event value domains and expression languages used.
Instead, they are defined in terms of generic characteristics such as their LTS semantics. As a result,
extending the monitor language with constructs such as parallel composition would not affect the
existing framework. The instrumentation relation one adopts for composing monitors with systems
necessarily affects the compositional properties and the correspondence between the respective
definitions. However, these changes do not impinge on the general structure of our definitions and
should be local to the detection condition in the resp. controllability definitions, namely Def. 11(i),
19(i) and 24(i), and the reachability-set definitions aft(−), saft(−) and osaft(−) of Defs. 10, 18 and 24.
Future work We will further investigate the implementability aspects of our analysis, possibly as
an extension to existing model-checking tools. This may raise further issues and adjustments to our
definitions e.g., it may be more efficient to batch the satisfiability checks in Def. 24. We plan to apply
this to existing transition-based monitor specifications such as [5, 46] and validate its feasibility as an
automated specification assistant.
Related Work The need for determinising monitor syntheses from logical specifications is fre-
quently discussed in the literature [7, 23]. In [1], the authors employ a trace-based definition of
deterministic monitors that takes into consideration verdicts (similar to our definition for consistent
detections of Def. 6 but without considering universal quantification over system instrumentations)
and establish complexity bounds for determinising monitors wrt. this definition. Set-simulations,
which are related to our monitor-sets, have been used as a proof technique for testing preorders in
[15] but do not consider symbolic analyses. Acceptor ambiguity [29] is closely related to our notion
of consistent detection with respect to the three outcomes of acceptance, rejection and withholding, as
specified in Def. 6. Crucially, however, our definition universally quantifies over all possible system
compositions. Subsequently, the main endeavour of our work was that of developing sound and
complete compositional techniques to alleviate the analysis for consistent detection; we are unaware
of any compositional or coinductive techniques used for determining acceptor ambiguity. Symbolic
LTSs were studied extensively for value-passing CCS in [27, 28], but their use in controllability for
reasoning about consistent monitor detections is, to our knowledge, novel. The particular setting
where it is used, namely the instrumentation composition relation and the use of monitor-sets, also
require new technical machinery, such as that of Def. 18. Our definition of controllability, Def. 11, is
related to viability (usability) for clients in contract compliance [39] and must-testing [9]. Particularly,
in the case of compliance, viability is defined coinductively and is satisfied whenever there exists
a server that can engage with the client so as to lead it to success whenever interaction terminates.
Apart from the universal quantifications over systems (viability existentially quantifies over servers),
our work differs from [39, 9] wrt. the treatment of verdicts considered, the composition relation used
(i.e., instrumentation), and the development of a symbolic analysis for handling of action/event data.
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